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TOILING IN FACTORY AND ON FARM: AN 
EMPLOYER-FRIENDLY APPROACH TO THE 
COMPENSABILITY OF DONNING AND DOFFING 
ACTIVITIES UNDER THE “FLSA” 
JACOB A. BRUNER* 
ABSTRACT 
No realm of employment litigation has been more active in recent years than 
class action lawsuits under the FLSA. Although the FLSA was originally enacted to 
help those who toiled in factories and on farms obtain a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s 
work, it continues to haunt unwary employers nearly seventy years later. This Note 
attempts to resolve those problems through the proposition of a single, uniform, and 
employer-friendly standard for donning and doffing claims arising under the FLSA. 
Specifically, this Note argues that courts should construe the “integral and 
indispensable” test narrowly to protect employers from compensation claims for 
relatively effortless activities while also exposing them to litigation for work that is 
essential to completion of the principal activity, as contemplated by early labor 
standard advocates. This ensures that legitimate claims for uncompensated work 
time are fully covered by the FLSA and that frivolous suits fall by the wayside. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
No realm of employment litigation has been more active in recent years than 
class action lawsuits under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).1 Although the 
FLSA was originally enacted in 1938 to “to help those who toil[ed] in factor[ies] and 
on farm[s]” obtain “a fair days pay for a fair days work,” it continues to haunt 
unwary employers nearly seventy years later.2  
Over the past decade, the number of FLSA lawsuits filed nationwide has 
increased more than 300%, while the total amount of cases continues to rise each 
year.3 Commentators have offered varying opinions to explain the growing trend of 
litigation: increased employee awareness of the Act’s requirements, assertive 
employees’ counsel’s widespread mining for plaintiffs, more sophisticated use of the 
internet, increasingly transient workers with dwindling loyalties to a single 
employer, the relative ease with which claims may be brought, and the potential for 
large, aggregate damage awards.4 Most prominently, however, the outdated and 
ambiguous language of the statute has resulted in significant gray areas that serve as 
fertile breeding grounds for potential claims.5  
Following the economic decline of the 1920s, the FLSA was adopted to serve 
two broad functions: (1) spread employment across the largest possible span of 
                                                          
 1  See The Proliferation of FLSA Collective Actions, LAW360 (June 28, 2007), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/28245/the-proliferation-of-flsa-collective-actions. 
 2  Id.; see also Message to Congress on Establishing Minimum Wages and Maximum 
Hours, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15405 (last 
visited July 15, 2015) (discussing the purpose of the FLSA at the time of enactment). 
 3  See A Developing and Simple Faragher Defense to FLSA Claims, CORP. COMPLIANCE 
INSIGHTS (Jan. 17, 2013), http://corporatecomplianceinsights.com/kelly-kolb/ (citing Federal 
Judicial Caseload and Statistics, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
reports/analysis-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics (last visited November 17, 2016)). 
 4  See Douglas Darch et al., Compensable Time, PRACTICAL LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW 
(West 2015) (providing an overview of common class action lawsuits under the FLSA based 
on an employer’s failure to recognize and count certain hours worked as compensable). 
 5  See Number of New FLSA Lawsuits filed Each Continues to Rise, A.B.A. (Oct. 14, 
2010), https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/101410-rise-in-flsa-
employment-and-labor.html. 
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available workers, and (2) alleviate oppressive working conditions.6 Congress 
intended to accomplish these goals by placing a ceiling over the number of hours 
worked, a floor under the amount of wages earned, and restrictions on most kinds of 
child labor.7 Legislators anticipated that these measures would increase the number 
of jobs and reduce high unemployment rates by limiting the hours each individual 
employee could work before employers would be forced to pay them extra 
compensation—an explicit financial disincentive to deter employers from forcing 
workers to work excessive hours.8 Further, the enactment of minimum wage laws 
and child labor restrictions would eliminate the prevalence of labor conditions 
“detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standards of living necessary for 
health, efficiency, and well-being of workers.”9 At the time of its enactment, 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt characterized the FLSA as “the most far reaching, 
far-sighted program for the benefit of workers ever adopted in this or any other 
country.”10 
In the years since Roosevelt’s proclamation, however, the federal courts have 
struggled to reach a consensus on activities that constitute compensable “work.”11 
Generally, an entity is said to “employ” a person under the FLSA if it “suffers or 
permits [a person] to work.”12 Although the FLSA requires overtime pay for work 
performed in excess of forty hours per week, it does not define the meaning of the 
term “work.”13 While certain “preliminary” and “postliminary” activities have been 
expressly excluded from compensability under the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, the 
federal courts have been tasked with filling in the gaps.14 The broad meaning that has 
emerged from Supreme Court cases describes “work” as an exertion or loss of 
employees’ time that is (1) controlled or required by the employer, (2) pursued 
necessarily and primarily for the employer’s benefit, and (3) if performed outside 
scheduled work time, then such performances are an “integral and indispensable” 
                                                          
 6  See FLSA: A Two-Minute History Issue No. 582, 2013 WL 420439 (West 2015) 
(describing the primary purposes behind the Congressional enactment of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act); see also FLSA: A Two-Minute History, CCH EMPLOYMENT LAW BRIEFING: 
WHITE COLLAR EXEMPTION REVISIONS (April 21, 2004), 
https://www.cch.com/press/news/2004/EmploymentLawBriefing.pdf. 
 7  See generally Fair Labor Standards Act, UNITED STATES HISTORY, http://www.u-s-
history.com/pages/h1701.html (last visited July 15, 2015). 
 8  Id. 
 9  Id. 
 10  Id. 
 11  Darch et al., supra note 4. 
 12  29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2015).  
 13  See generally 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2015); see also Jordan v. IBP, Inc. 542 F. Supp. 2d 790 
(M.D Tenn. 2008) (citing Tenn. Coal, Iron, & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 
590, 597 (1944) (“In determining whether [a certain activity] constitutes compensable work or 
employment within the meaning of the [FLSA], we are not guided by any precise statutory 
definition of work or employment.”)). 
 14  See 29 U.S.C. § 254 (2015); see also IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 41 (2005) 
(noting that the Portal-to-Portal Act did not purport to change the Supreme Court’s earlier 
descriptions of the term “work”). 
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part of the employee’s principal activities.15 Nowhere has this analysis been more 
controversial than in the context of donning and doffing activities.16 
Donning and doffing—time spent putting on or taking off protective clothes and 
gear—has been a major source of litigation in recent years.17 Donning and doffing 
cases generally involve the following sequence of events: 
 
In a typical scenario, the employee commutes from his or her home to the employer’s 
facility, and upon entering the facility, proceeds to a locker room. This time is termed 
“pre-doffing” because it elapses before the donning of protective gear occurs. After 
the employee dons the required protective gear, he or she typically walks to an 
assigned work area. The time between the donning of protective gear and the start of 
actual production tasks is termed “post-donning.” After completing production tasks 
and completed his or her shift, the employee walks back to the locker room. The time 
between the end of production tasks and the doffing of protective gear is termed “pre-
doffing.” After the employee doffs (and perhaps washes protective gear), he or she 
leaves the plant. This time is termed “post-doffing.”18 
Unfortunately for employers, the outcome of these cases depends frequently on the 
specific facts of the case and the presiding jurisdiction where the claim is filed.19 
Four separate tests have emerged in the various courts of appeal: 
(1) The “unique versus non-unique gear” test; 
(2) The “exertion” test; 
(3) The “benefit to employer versus employee” test; 
(4) Various hybrid models adopted in other jurisdictions.20 
Each method attempts to describe activities that are so “integral and indispensable” 
to the employee’s principal activity that they are properly characterized as 
compensable “work.”21  
Consequently, employers have been left guessing whether certain tasks require 
compensation and find themselves at risk for litigation.22 This position poses a 
number of significant problems. First, the costs and attorney’s fees associated with 
defending against pending litigation are substantial. Second, frivolous claims present 
challenges for employers because most are poorly versed in the nuances of wage and 
                                                          
 15  Chao v. Gotham Registry, Inc., 514 F.3d 280, 285 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 16  Darch et al., supra note 4. 
 17  Id. 
 18  James Watts, Dressing for Work is Work: Compensating Employees Under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act for Donning and Doffing Protective Gear, 87 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 
297 (2010) (evaluating the reasoning employed by the circuit courts of appeal to determine 
whether employees must be compensated for the donning and doffing of protective gear). 
 19  Darch et al., supra note 4. 
 20  Id. 
 21  Watts, supra note 18. 
 22  The Proliferation of FLSA Collective Actions, supra note 1 (noting that employers have 
been advised merely to review their practices to take account of the most commonly litigated 
activities to help determine whether tasks should be compensated). 
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hour laws.23 Third, many employers also endure significant measures to limit 
exposure in the future and incur a number of non-financial burdens as well, 
including high levels of stress, damaged reputations, and fewer resources available to 
operate the business.24  
This Note attempts to resolve those problems through the proposition of a single, 
uniform, and employer-friendly standard for donning and doffing claims arising 
under the FLSA. Specifically, this Note seeks to limit employers’ exposure to 
litigation by narrowing the possible avenues through which employees can seek 
compensation. In doing so, this Note recognizes the importance of shielding unwary 
employers from liability against today’s onslaught of wage and hour claims.  
Part II of this Note provides a lengthy background discussion of the history of the 
FLSA. Part II.A begins with a discussion of the early years of the labor reform 
movement to consider the Act’s purpose and origins. Part II.B supplements the 
discussion in Part II.A through a study of the New Deal era to highlight the effects of 
important Supreme Court cases on the development of the nation’s most prominent 
wage and hour law.  
Part III provides an overview of the statutory language, amendments, and case 
law that guide claims for compensation under the FLSA to familiarize readers with a 
number of interconnected legal doctrines that form the basis of donning and doffing 
litigation.25  
Part IV of this Note summarizes the current state of the law through a survey of 
various donning and doffing tests that circuit courts have adopted around the country 
before synthesizing their holdings in the context of this Note’s proposal. 
Part V of this Note argues that courts should construe the “integral and 
indispensable” test narrowly to provide the most amount of protection for modern 
day employers. Part V.A identifies the circuit court tests that best effectuate this 
proposal by considering employers’ potential exposure to litigation in each 
jurisdiction. Part V.B then highlights the pragmatic concerns imposed by broader 
tests in the context of a recent Supreme Court decision. 
Part VI comments on potential criticism of this Note’s proposal in light of the 
legislative history and purpose of the FLSA before outlining how the Second Circuit 
has already incorporated these policy concerns into its employer-friendly standard. 
Part VII of this Note offers a brief conclusion and shifts gears to discuss the 
potential impact of the proposal on plaintiff-employees. 
                                                          
 23  Id. 
 24  See generally Employment Litigation and Dispute Resolution, DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/dunlop/section4.htm (last visited July 15, 2015). 
 25  Note that collective bargaining issues raised within the context of Section 203(o) are 
outside the scope of this paper. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2015). 
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II. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK OF WAGE AND HOUR LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. The Early Labor Movements and the Progressive Era 
“The History of the FLSA has included some big steps forward—and a few steps 
back . . .” -Collete Irving, National Women’s Law Center26 
 
For almost an entire century prior to passage of the FLSA in 1938, demand for 
progressive labor reform grew as the country moved from an agrarian to an industrial 
society.27 The life of a nineteenth-century American industrial worker was far from 
easy: wages were low, hours were long, and factory conditions were poor.28 Most of 
the country’s financial resources were concentrated in the hands of capitalists while 
a majority of workers, both skilled and unskilled, suffered the effects of periodic 
market fluctuations, eroding wages, and high levels of unemployment.29 To make 
matters worse, large influxes of migrants empowered industry bosses by increasing 
the supply of cheap labor, and technological advancements made unskilled workers 
expendable.30 Predictably, early attempts for labor reform were unsuccessful.31 Some 
reformists were even indicted and prosecuted for criminal conspiracy as a result of 
their reformist activities.32 In 1842, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court put an 
end to those prosecutions in Commonwealth v. Hunt.33 Hunt ultimately repudiated 
the application of old English Common Law to post-Revolutionary America and 
sparked the first sign of progress for the American labor movement.34  
In the wake of Hunt and other labor combination cases, thousands of workers 
fled to join workers’ rights organizations in hopes of establishing stronger 
coalitions.35 Through entities such as the American Federation of Labor and its 
predecessor, the Knights of Labor, workers from all socioeconomic categories united 
                                                          
 26  Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA): Care Work is Real Work—And Must be 
Compensated as Such, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. (May 11, 2015), 
http://www.nwlc.org/tags/fair-labor-standards-act-flsa. 
 27  See Troubled Passage: The Labor Movement and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Dec. 2000), http://stats.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2000/12/art3full.pdf. 
 28  See The Struggle of Labor, AMERICAN HISTORY, 
http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/outlines/history-1994/discontent-and-reform/the-struggle-of-
labor.php (last visited July 15, 2015). 
 29  Id. 
 30  See The Early Labor Movement, PBS.ORG, 
http://www.pbs.org/opb/historydetectives/feature/the-early-labor-movement/ (last visited July 
15, 2015). 
 31  The Struggle of Labor, supra note 28. 
 32  See DAVID TWORNEY, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: TEXT & CASES § 2 (13th ed. 
2007). 
 33  Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (1 Met.) 111 (1842). 
 34  Hunt, 45 Mass. at 111 (“We can not perceive that it is criminal for men to agree 
together to exercise their own acknowledged rights, in such as a manner as best to subserve 
their own interests.”). 
 35  The Struggle of Labor, supra note 28. 
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to embrace their desires for freedom from industrial order.36 These efforts became 
known as the “short hours movements.”37 Activists believed that shorter work hours 
would usher in a new and progressive era of labor life in three ways: first, shorter 
hours would protect the safety of workers by tempering worker fatigue and reducing 
the prevalence of occupational injuries; second, shorter work hours would increase 
personal welfare by reducing labor strife and allowing more time for home and 
family life; third, shorter hours reflected a moral belief that measures ought to be 
taken to counter the effects of harsh working conditions.38 A number of significant 
labor reforms followed in the wake of the “short hours movement:” federal ten-hour 
workdays, Labor Day, two-day weekends, and more.39 States would eventually get 
on board as well.40  
By 1884, labor was no longer a “united force,” and Federations had differing 
ideas about democracy, politics, legislation, immigration, and the inclusion of certain 
minorities:  
On the left were the socialists; the middle road was held by the Knights 
[of Labor]; the right was shared by F.O.O.T.A.L.U [“Federation of 
Organized Trades and Labor Unions”] and the independent trade unions. 
There was disagreement over methods. Socialists were divided between 
trade unionists, advocates of political action, and advocates of violence; 
the Knights fostered the “one big union”; the trades were vacillating 
between economic and legislative action . . .  [The] socialists looked to 
overthrow the capitalistic order; the Knights looked to the destruction of 
the wage system and the eventual establishment of a cooperative 
economic system which included both owners and laborers; the trade 
were becoming more and more conscious of the magical quality of high 
wages to solve all their troubles.41 
As heated as the debates became within the Federations themselves, class 
warfare between the working class and laissez-faire capitalists like John D. 
Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie resulted in some of the most violent labor 
conflicts in the nation’s brief history.42 These conflicts played out on the national 
stage through the railway strike of 1877, Haymarket Square riot of 1886, Homestead 
strike of 1892, Pullman strike and boycott of 1892, anthracite strike of 1902, 
garment workers’ uprisings of 1909-1911, and the steel strike of 1919.43  
                                                          
 36  Scott D. Miller, Revitalizing the FLSA, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1 (2001) 
(examining the original rationales of maximum hours labor standards, reviewing empirical 
research corroborating their continued relevance, and outlining proposed changes to the 
FLSA). 
 37  Id. at 7-8. 
 38  Id. at 9. 
 39  Id. at 15. 
 40  Id. 
 41  JOSEPH G. RAYBACK, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR, 158-59 (1966).  
 42  The Struggle of Labor, supra note 28. 
 43  Miller, supra note 36.  
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Meanwhile, the Federations faced even stronger opposition from the U.S. 
Supreme Court.44 Over the first three decades of the twentieth century, the Supreme 
Court managed to deal significant blows to the labor reform movement through a 
wave of cases attacking the constitutionality of minimum wage laws, maximum hour 
limits, and child labor provisions.45  
1.  Hammer v. Dagenhart 
Hammer v. Dagenhart, opined in 1918, is among the most noteworthy Supreme 
Court cases decided.46 Roland Dagenhart, the litigant in the case, worked in a cotton 
mill in Charlotte, North Carolina with his two minor sons, both of whom were barred 
from employment at the mill under the Keating-Owen Act of 1916 (“Child Labor 
Act”).47 The Child Labor Act, originally enacted pursuant to congressional 
commerce power, prohibited the transportation in interstate commerce of goods 
produced at factories where children were employed beneath a certain age.48  
Dagenhart brought suit seeking an injunction that would bar the statute’s 
enforcement.49 Dagenhart argued that the Act unconstitutionally exceeded the scope 
of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.50 Writing for the majority of the 
Court, Justice William R. Day struck down the law, in a significant departure from 
Supreme Court precedent that had permitted use of congressional policing power to 
regulate the health, safety, morality and general welfare of individuals under the 
Commerce Clause.51 The Court reasoned that Congress’s commerce power could 
only be used to prohibit the interstate shipment of intrinsically harmful goods, like 
lottery tickets or impure food, but not items that were harmless in and of themselves, 
like the products of child labor.52  
While Hammer proved to be a major victory for Mr. Dagenhart and family, 
Justice Holmes’ famous dissent characterized his dissatisfaction with the decision as 
follows: 
If there is any matter upon which civilized countries have agreed—far 
more unanimously than they have with regard to intoxicants and some 
other matters over which this country is now emotionally aroused—it is 
the evil of premature and excessive child labor. I should have thought that 
if we were to introduce our own moral conceptions where it is my opinion 
                                                          
 44  See Fair Labor Standards Act, supra note 7. 
 45  Id. 
 46  Hammer v Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (prohibiting the transportation in 
interstate commerce of manufactured goods produced in factories employing children under 
the age of fourteen). 
 47  Id. at 268. 
 48  Id. at 269. 
 49  Id. at 268. 
 50  Id. at 269. 
 51  Id. at 276-77. 
 52  See Logan E. Sawyer III, Creating Hammer v. Dagenhart, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 67 (2012) (defending the Court’s use of federal policing power in its widely criticized 
opinion in Hammer v. Dagenhart). 
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they do not belong, this was preeminently a cause for upholding the 
exercise of all of its powers by the United States.53 
Hammer was the first of many setbacks for the fair labor standards movement of 
the time. 
2.  Adkins v. Children’s Hospital 
Five years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hammer, the judiciary sent 
another crushing blow to labor reformists by striking down a District of Columbia 
statute that would have established minimum wage laws for women.54 The D.C. law 
created a board to investigate, solicit input, and ultimately set minimum wages for 
women and children to protect them from conditions detrimental to their health and 
morals.55 When the board eventually set an agreed upon wage, a local hospital—well 
known for employing women at wages below the recommended amount—decided to 
sue the board.56 The hospital attacked the law as unconstitutional on grounds that it 
violated the “liberty of contract” doctrine previously established in Lochner v. New 
York.57  
In a 5-3 decision written by Justice Sutherland, the Court agreed and held the law 
to be an “arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract” because the statute 
imposed uniform wages on all women regardless of need and prevented them from 
obtaining results through private bargaining.58 Despite years of progress, the Lochner 
era appeared to reaffirm the “backward looking and politicized commitment to 
laissez faire economics.”59  
B. The Great Depression and the “New Deal” 
“All but the hopelessly reactionary will agree that to conserve our primary 
resources of man power, government must have some control over maximum hours, 
minimum wages, the evil of child labor, and the exploitation of unorganized labor.”-
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on Establishing Minimum 
Wages and Maximum Hours (May 24, 1937)60 
                                                          
 53  Hammer, 247 U.S. at 280. 
 54  See Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of the D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923) (invalidating 
D.C.’s minimum wage law for women on Lochner era principles).  
 55  Id. at 539-42. 
 56  Id. at 542. 
 57  Id. at 545 (“The statute now under consideration is attacked upon the ground that it 
authorizes an unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract included within the 
guaranties of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.”); see also Lochner v. New 
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (upholding “liberty of contract” doctrine for employees in bakery 
pursuant to the substantive component of the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause).  
 58  Adkins, 261 U.S. at 545, 559; see also Alex McBride, Capitalism and Conflict, 
PBS.ORG (Dec. 2006), 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/capitalism/landmark_adkins.html. 
 59  See Sawyer III, supra note 52, at 68. 
 60  See Message to Congress, supra note 2. 
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Reform came to a halt during the economic boom of the 1920s partly because of 
the Supreme Court decisions discussed above and a growing desire for less 
government regulation, which resulted in less need for activism.61 Fortunately for 
workers, labor organizations maintained  “structures of reform” throughout the 
decade that would form the foundation for change in the wake of the Great 
Depression.62 On October 29, 1929, the stock market crashed, setting off a 
worldwide decline in economic standards like nothing anyone had seen before.63  
By 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt had already jump-started the wheels of a “New 
Deal” for American workers.64 Roosevelt promised to restore faith in American 
industries through ardent labor reform and to enact emergency measures that would 
counter the effects of high unemployment that the Depression created.65 
Accordingly, Roosevelt nominated Frances Perkins as his Secretary of Labor and 
instructed her to begin work under the National Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”).66 
The NIRA shared many of the same goals as labor federations: eight-hour 
workdays, forty-hour workweeks, improved working conditions, etc.67 But the NIRA 
faced opposition from the Supreme Court as well.68 On May 27, 1935, the Supreme 
Court disarmed major provisions of the statute in the famous “sick chicken” case, A. 
L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp., et al. v. United States.69  
1.  A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp., et al. v. United States 
Schechter involved a challenge to Section 3 of the NIRA, which empowered the  
President to approve “codes of fair competition” for a number of trades, including 
the poultry processing industry, and impose penalties for violations of the code in 
any transaction affecting commerce.70 These codes regulated schedules of minimum 
wages, prices, maximum work hours, collective bargaining, and other rules that 
would be binding upon entire industries.71 Schechter Poultry Corporation was 
charged with having violated the poultry code by selling sick chickens to butchers in 
                                                          
 61  See Miller, supra note 36, at 16. 
 62  Id. at 17. 
 63  See Charless Duhigg, Depression, You Say? Check Those Safety Nets, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 23, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/23/weekinreview/23duhigg.html?n=Top%2FReference%2F
Times%20Topics%2FSubjects%2FF%2FFinances.  
 64  See Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a 
Minimum Wage, DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/flsa1938.htm#3 
(last visited July 15, 2015). 
 65  Id. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Id.; see also Miller, supra note 36, at 18-19. 
 68  See Grossman, supra note 64. 
 69  A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating as 
unconstitutional a provision of the NIRA that authorized the President to approve codes of fair 
competition for the poultry processing industry). 
 70  Id. at 521-22. 
 71  Id. at 522. 
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the northeast region of the country.72 Thereafter, Schechter challenged the 
constitutionality of the NIRA as an unconstitutional exercise of congressional 
commerce powers and a violation of separation of powers principles.73 In an opinion 
written by Chief Justice Hughes, the Court unanimously reversed the convictions 
and held that, because the NIRA was an unconstitutional delegation of authority, the 
Code enacted pursuant to that authority was void.74 Even if the Code was an 
otherwise valid regulation, the Court noted that it could not be applied against the 
defendants because they were engaged in strictly local activities with no direct effect 
on interstate commerce: 
Were these transactions ‘in’ interstate commerce? Much is made of the 
fact that almost all the poultry coming to New York is sent there from 
other states. But the code provisions, as here applied, do not concern the 
transportation of the poultry from other states to New York, or the 
transactions of the commission men or others to whom it is cosigned, or 
the sales made by such cosignees to defendants. When defendants made 
their purchases, whether at the West Washington Market in New York 
City or at the railroad terminals serving the city, or elsewhere, the poultry 
was trucked to their slaughterhouses in Brooklyn for local disposition. 
The interstate transactions in relation to that poultry then ended. 
Defendants held the poultry at their slaughterhouse markets for slaughter 
and the local sale to retail dealers and butchers who in turn sold directs to 
consumers. Neither the slaughtering nor the sales by defendants were 
transactions in interstate commerce.75  
Following major policy blows in Schechter and related state and federal labor cases, 
President Roosevelt terminated the administration in charge of promulgating rules 
under the NIRA and went back to the drawing board.76 
Wage and hour legislation was a major campaign issue again in the 1936 
presidential race between Roosevelt and Alf Landon, a Republican Governor from 
the State of Kansas.77 To date, the 1936 faceoff is the most lopsided presidential 
election victory in the history of the United States: Democratic incumbent Franklin 
D. Roosevelt won a total of 583 electoral votes in comparison to the 8 Landon won.78 
Roosevelt interpreted the landslide victory as support for his New Deal platform.79 
                                                          
 72  Id. at 527. 
 73  Id. at 519. 
 74  Id. at 541-42; see generally Barry Cushman, A Stream of Legal Consciousness: The 
Current of Commerce Doctrine From Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 105 
(1992) (arguing that the Court’s “switch in time” was conceptually, stylistically, and 
doctrinally congruent with the Court’s contemporary jurisprudence). 
 75  Schechter, 295 U.S. at 542-43. 
 76  See Miller, supra note 36, at 19-20. 
 77  See On This Day, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 1987), 
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0909.html. 
 78  See 1936 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, 270TOWIN, 
http://www.270towin.com/1936_Election/ (last visited July 15, 2015). 
 79  See Grossman, supra note 64. 
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Roosevelt was determined to overcome decades-long scrutiny by the Supreme 
Court.80  
In February 1937, Roosevelt struck back at the Justices through his Court-
Packing Plan.81 The effect of the proposal would be to ultimately reduce the power 
of each individual voter on the Court by saturating the bench with new members—a 
concept the Justices would certainly disfavor: 
Whenever a Judge or Justice of any Federal Court has reached the age of 
seventy and does not avail himself of the opportunity to retire on a 
pension, a new member shall be appointed by the President then in office 
[up to an additional maximum of six Justices], with the approval, as 
required by the Constitution, of the Senate of the United States.82  
Before Roosevelt could act on his proposal, the Supreme Court reversed its 
course in what has come to be known as the “switch in time that saved the nine.”83 
The switch is an important turning point for American legal history—even more so 
for fair labor standard advocates.84 West Coast Hotel followed suit.85 
2. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish 
Less than a decade removed from the Lochner era, an era in which the Court 
struck down minimum wage laws for women and invalidated efforts to improve 
labor standards on a nationwide scale, a significant theoretical shift in the Supreme 
Court occurred in 1937.86 In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, a former hotel 
chambermaid brought suit against a Washington-based hotel to recover $216.19 in 
back wages stemming from state minimum wage violations.87 On March 29, 1937, 
the Court ruled in favor of Elsie Parrish with a liberal minority to uphold the validity 
of the Washington law and provide the framework for enactment of the FLSA just 
one year later.88 
Following West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, labor advocates learned of an interesting 
story. In 1933, when President Roosevelt asked Frances Perkins to become his 
Secretary of Labor, she told him that she would accept if she could advocate a law 
that would regulate wages, hours, and child labor—the three pillars of labor reform 
that would later become the foundation of the FLSA.89 When Roosevelt agreed, 
                                                          
 80  Id. 
 81  Id. 
 82  See Fireside Chat: On “Court-Packing”, MILLER CTR. (Mar. 9, 1937), 
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3309. 
 83  See Grossman, supra note 64. 
 84  Id. 
 85  See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 86  See Grossman, supra note 64. 
 87  West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 388. 
 88  Id. at 586; see also Grossman, supra note 64. 
 89  Grossman, supra note 64.  For an overview of the three main objectives of the FLSA, 
see supra Section I. 
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Perkins cautioned the President that “to launch such a program . . . might be 
considered unconstitutional?”90 Roosevelt responded, “Well we can work out 
something when the time comes.”91 In the aftermath of Schechter and various 
challenges to the NIRA, Secretary Perkins asked lawyers at the Department of Labor 
to draw up a number of wage, hour, and child-labor bills that she hoped could 
survive Judicial review.92 She then locked the bills in her desk drawer and informed 
the President what she had done.93 One of the bills, known later to be the Davis-
Bacon Act, proposed using the purchasing power of the Government contractors as 
an instrument for improving labor standards in the construction industry.94 Although 
the bill proved successful at times before “the Switch,” the Act was later 
supplemented with more progressive legislation in the form of the Public Contracts 
Act of 1936 (“Walsh-Healey Act”).95 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
West Coast Hotel, “When he felt the time was ripe, [President Roosevelt] asked 
[Secretary of Labor] Frances Perkins, ‘What happened to that nice unconstitutional 
bill you tucked away?’”96 
That bill—a general piece of legislation on fair labor standards—would 
eventually turn into the FLSA.97 After months of heated debate and substantial 
compromise within both houses of Congress, FDR signed the bill into law on June 
25, 1938.98 United States v. Darby later affirmed its constitutionality.99 
III. OVERVIEW OF THE FLSA AND ITS PROGENY 
The structure of the FLSA is nearly as complicated as its history. Several 
interconnecting statutes and legal doctrines affect compensation requirements under 
the FLSA.100 Aside from the language of the statute itself, these include a number of 
amendments (such as the Portal-to-Portal Act), the “continuous workday rule,” and 
various legal doctrines (including the “integral and indispensable” activity test, 
“engaged to wait” test, and de minimis time doctrine) that attempt to define the outer 
boundaries of compensable “work.” This Note considers each in turn below. 
A. Scope of the FLSA 
29 U.S.C. § 202 (“FLSA”) reads as follows: 
                                                          
 90  Grossman, supra note 64. 
 91  Id. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Id. 
 94  Id. 
 95  Id. 
 96  Id. 
 97  Id. 
 98  Id. 
 99  United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (upholding the validity of the FLSA 
under congressional commerce power). 
 100  Watts, supra note 18, at 299. 
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(a) The Congress finds that the existence, in industries engaged in 
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, of labor 
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of 
living necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being of workers 
(1) causes commerce and the channels and instrumentalities of commerce 
to be used to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among the 
workers of the several States; (2) burdens commerce and the free flow of 
goods in commerce; (3) constitutes an unfair method of competition in 
commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes burdening and obstructing 
commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and (5) interferes 
with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce. That Congress 
Further finds that the employment of persons in domestic service in 
households affects commerce; 
 
(b) It is declared to be the policy of this chapter, through the exercise by 
Congress of its power to regulate commerce among the several States and 
with foreign nations, to correct and as rapidly as practicable to eliminate 
the conditions above referred to in such industries without substantially 
curtailing employment or earning power.101 
The U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) indicates in its guidance on the FLSA 
that the statute “establishes minimum wage, overtime pay, recordkeeping, and youth 
employment standards affecting employees in the private sector and Federal, State, 
and local governments.”102 Generally speaking, the Act requires employers to pay 
covered employees who are engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for 
commerce at a minimum wage of $7.25 per hour—a figure that has steadily risen 
since the enactment of the statute in the 1930s.103 The FLSA also requires employers 
to pay at least time-and-a-half to covered employees who work more than forty 
hours in a given workweek.104 Numerous exemptions and exceptions are provided as 
to the payment of both minimum wages and overtime, most of which are beyond the 
scope of this paper.105 Sections 11(c) and 12, respectively, require employers subject 
to the FLSA to (1) maintain records in accordance with regulations promulgated by 
the Wage and Hour Administrator and (2) prohibit the shipment or delivery of 
commerce produced by oppressive child labor.106 The FLSA provides a number of 
remedies to aggrieved plaintiffs: criminal sanctions, private suits for the payment of 
                                                          
 101  29 U.S.C. § 202 (2015). 
 102  See Compliance Assistance—Wages and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), DEP’T 
OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/whd/flsa/ (last visited July 15, 2015). 
 103  See The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA): An Overview, CONG. RES. SERV. (July 4, 
2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42713.pdf; see also 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2015) 
[hereinafter An Overview]. 
 104 Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2016).  
 105  See Les A. Schneider & J. Larry Stine, Wage and Hour Law: Compliance and Practice, 
1 WAGE & HOUR LAW 1 § 3 (2015). 
 106  Id. 
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back wages, liquidated damages, attorney’s fees and costs, and injunctive actions, 
which the Wage and Hour Administrator can commence.107  
After more than seventy years, the FLSA remains the primary federal statute 
setting the minimum wage and maximum hour standards applicable to most 
American workers.108 Despite its impact on employment practices for over a half-
century, many employers are still unclear on the language of the statute—and 
rightfully so.109 Although the FLSA governs certain aspects of the employment 
relationship, the statute fails to provide clearly defined limits on that relationship.110 
Section 203(d) defines an “employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly in 
the interest of an employer in relation to any employee.”111 Meanwhile, the term 
“employee” is defined as “any individual employed by an employer” and an entity is 
said to “employ” an individual under the FLSA if it “suffers or permits [him or her] 
to work.”112  
Pursuant to these basic guidelines, most FLSA litigation can be divided into three 
categories:  
(1) Misclassification of employees as exempt from overtime 
requirements;  
 
(2) Misclassification of employees as independent contractors not eligible 
for overtime over minimum wage; and  
 
(3) Failure to pay nonexempt employees for all hours worked.  
This Note focuses strictly on the third category.113 
B. The Portal-to-Portal Act and “Continuous Workday” Rule 
Since 1938, the FLSA has been amended on multiple occasions, most 
prominently in 1947 with the passing of the Portal-to-Portal Act.114 In the wake of 
vague definitions, confusing DOL regulations, and judicial uncertainty, compliance 
with the statute became increasingly complex in the years following its enactment.115 
Large employers and wealthy businessmen—many of whom shared ideals 
reminiscent of tyrannical industry bosses—were fearful of potential 
overcompensation of employees in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Anderson v. Mt. Clemons Pottery, Co.116  
                                                          
 107  Id. 
 108  See Miller, supra note 36, at 2-3. 
 109  See An Overview, supra note 103. 
 110  Id. 
 111  29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2015). 
 112  29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2015).  
 113  See Darch et al., supra note 4. 
 114  See Watts, supra note 18, at 4. 
 115  See Miller, supra note 36, at 23 (discussing how the FLSA passed by “legislative fiat”). 
 116  Anderson v. Mt. Clemons Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692-93 (1946) (holding that 
preliminary work activities, where controlled by the employer and performed entirely for the 
employer’s benefit, are properly included as working time under the FLSA). 
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Anderson involved a group of employees who brought suit to recover lost wages 
for time spent walking to and from clock-in stations at a large pottery plant.117 The 
employees were required to enter the plant at a time station located in the northeast 
corner of the grounds before working their way through the eight acres of factory 
floor to the production area where they performed their work, including various 
preliminary duties.118 Despite arriving nearly fourteen minutes prior to their clock-in 
times and leaving nearly fourteen minutes after their clock-out times, workers were 
paid for a straight eight hours of work—fifty-six minutes fewer per day than the 
amount alleged in their complaint.119 Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice 
Murphy held that the plaintiffs were entitled to compensation for their activities 
under the FLSA.120  
Congress then swiftly and forcefully enacted 29 U.S.C. § 254 (the “Portal-to-
Portal Act”) in response to Anderson to repudiate claims for compensation stemming 
from routine travel and other inherently preliminary or postliminary activities.121 The 
Portal-to-Portal Act states, in part:  
No employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment on the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938 . . . on account of the failure . . . to pay an 
employee minimum wages or to pay an employee overtime compensation, 
for or on account of any of the following activities . . .  
 
(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of 
performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is 
employed to perform, and 
 
(2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal 
activity or activities. . . .122 
The DOL has promulgated one large exception to this rule through its 
“continuous workday” rule, which generally requires compensation for all activities 
taking place in “the period between the commencement and completion on the same 
workday of an employee’s principal activity or activities . . . and includes all time 
within that period whether or not the employee engages in work throughout all of 
that period.”123  
Understandably, federal courts have struggled to adopt a uniform test to wean out 
those activities that are between the beginning and end of the employee’s principal 
activities, yet not of such preliminary or postliminary nature as to fall within the 
                                                          
 117  Id. at 682-83. 
 118  Id. 
 119  Id. at 682-84. 
 120  Id. at 694. 
 121  IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 37 (2005) (finding that time spent walking to 
production area after donning protective gear was covered by the FLSA). 
 122  29 U.S.C. § 254 (2015). 
 123  29 C.F.R. § 790.6(b) (2015). 
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Portal-to-Portal Act exceptions.124 Courts, however, have identified a number of 
legal doctrines to help narrow down compensable activities under the FLSA:  
(1) the integral and indispensable activity test;  
 
(2) the engaged to wait versus waiting to be engaged test; 
 
(3) the de minimis time doctrine.125  
C. “Integral and Indispensable” 
Activities performed before or after the principal activity which are “integral and 
indispensable” to that activity are compensable under the FLSA.126 The element of 
“integrality” primarily “turns on whether, in relation to the principal activity, a task 
is essential to completeness, organically joined, or linked or composed of constituent 
parts making a whole.”127 A number of cases illustrate, however, that certain 
activities which are “necessary” in the sense that they are required by law or the 
employer may not be “essential to completeness” if they are the modern paradigms 
of preliminary and postliminary activities.128 In that sense, “integral” and 
“indispensable” are not necessarily synonymous. 
D. Engaged to Wait Versus Waiting to Engage 
Time spent “engaged to wait” is also compensable, while time spent “wait[ing] to 
be engaged” is not.129 The critical issue, initially set forth in Skidmore v. Swift and 
now codified by statute, is whether “the employee is unable to use the [on-call] time 
effectively for his own purposes.”130 Key factors for determining the compensability 
of certain activities include: (1) whether the employee is required to remain on the 
employer’s premises, (2) the frequency of calls, (3) whether an employee can 
conduct personal activities while on call, and (4) the frequency of interruption from 
                                                          
 124  See Darch et al., supra note 4; see also infra Section V.B (regarding Integrity 
Solutions’ success in “squeezing into this gap”). 
 125  See Darch et al., supra note 4. 
 126  Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 252-53 (1956); see also Gorman v. Consol. Edison 
Corp., 488 F.3d 586, 592 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that integrality turns on whether, in relation 
to the principal activity, a task is “essential to completeness, organically joined or linked or 
composed of constituent parts making a whole”). 
 127  Gorman, 488 F.3d at 592. Note also that some courts have phrased the issue differently 
by focusing on whether the tasks are the sort of relatively non-physical and effortless 
movements anticipated by the Portal-to-Portal Act. 
 128  See, e.g., Steiner, 350 U.S. 227; Gorman, 488 F.3d 586. 
 129  29 C.F.R. § 785.14 (2015) (citing Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (finding that 
an administrative agency’s interpretative rules deserve deference according to their 
persuasiveness)). 
 130  29 C.F.R. § 785.15 (2015). 
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work calls.131 Generally speaking, however, the compensability for waiting time 
depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of the case.132 
E. De Minimis Time Doctrine 
The de minimis time doctrine prevents an employee from recovering for 
otherwise compensable labor when the matter at issue concerns only a few minutes 
of work beyond regularly scheduled hours and the employee is not required to exert 
a substantial amount of time and effort.133 In Brock v. City of Cincinnati and related 
cases in other circuits, courts have articulated three factors for consideration under 
the de minimis test: “(1) the practical administrative difficulty of recording the 
additional time; (2) the size of the claim in the aggregate; and (3) whether the 
claimants performed the work on a regular basis.”134 To apply the factors properly, a 
court must strike “a balance between requiring an employer to pay for activities it 
requires of its employees and the need to avoid split-second absurdities that are not 
justified by the actuality of the working conditions.”135 
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Keeping in mind the complicated and often convoluted legal doctrines that make 
up the FLSA, the critical issue is as follows: whether donning and doffing activities 
are so “integral and indispensable” to the employee’s principal activity in a given 
workday that they constitute compensable “work.” 
A.  Alvarez v. IBP, Inc.: “Unique Versus Non-Unique Gear” Test 
The “unique versus non-unique gear” test is best illustrated by the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Alvarez v. IBP, Inc.136 By and large, the Alvarez line of cases indicates 
that, for employers in the Ninth and Third Circuits, compensation should be paid 
when employees spend time donning and doffing industry-specific gear and 
clothing.137  
In Alvarez, employees of a meat production plant brought a class action lawsuit 
against their employer under the FLSA and related state provisions, alleging that the 
employer was required to compensate them for time it took to change into required 
and specialized protective clothing and gear.138 IBP, Inc., the meat packing empire of 
                                                          
 131  See WAGE AND HOUR DIV., DEP’T. OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #22: HOURS WORKED UNDER 
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) (2008), 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs22.pdf. 
 132  See 29 C.F.R. § 785.14 (2011). 
 133  Brock v. City of Cincinnati, 236 F.3d 793, 804 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 134  Id.; see also Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 650 F.3d 350, 373 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(addressing whether the employees’ acts in donning and doffing protective gear were “integral 
and indispensable” to the principal purpose of poultry processing or fell within the three-factor 
de minimis test). 
 135  Rutti v. Lojack Corp., Inc., 596 F.3d 1046, 1057 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lindow v. 
US, 738 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 136  Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 137  See Darch et al., supra note 4. 
 138  See Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 897. 
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the American West, employed a complicated, yet efficient, production process 
through which animals were slaughtered, moved along a series of chains into the 
slaughter division, stored in an overnight cooling facility, transported to the 
processing assembly line, and eventually cut, trimmed, divided, and packaged.139 To 
ensure that plant production ran on time, employees were required to be at their 
respective workstations by the time meat reached their position along the line.140 
Employees were required to complete a number of preliminary tasks prior to the start 
of their shifts and had to arrive early to “gather their assigned equipment, don . . . 
equipment in one of the . . . [plant’s] four locker rooms, and prepare work-related 
tools before venturing to the slaughter or processing floors.”141 At the end of every 
shift, employees were required to complete many of these same tasks in reverse and 
“clean, restore, and replace their tools and equipment.”142 Further, employees were 
only permitted to exit the processing and slaughter floors mid-shift after removing 
their outer garments, protective gear, gloves, scabbards, and chains.143 
Once shifts began, plant employees’ time was strictly regulated and monitored—
rest and meal-break times began as soon as the last piece of meat passed through the 
production line.144 Accordingly, IBP paid its plant employees according to a “gang 
time pay” model, based solely on the times during which employees were actually 
working on the production line (“line time”).145 Notably, this excluded any of the 
required time spent conducting pre-donning or post-doffing activities.146 Based on 
these practices, a number of employees filed suit to recover back-wages for (1) pre-
shift donning of protective gear and the preparation of work-related tools, (2) time 
spent donning and doffing protective gear during the thirty minute unpaid meal-
break, and (3) post-shift doffing of protection gear, cleaning, and storing of the gear 
and tools.147 
The Ninth Circuit, holding in favor of the Pasco plant employees in part, noted 
first that “because donning and doffing of this gear on the Pasco plant’s premises is 
required by law, by rules of [IBP], [and] by the nature of the work” the donning and 
doffing is “necessary” to the principal work performed and, therefore, “integral and 
indispensable” to the principal activities taking place on the production line.148 
Second, the court found that “it is beyond cavil that the donning, doffing, washing, 
and retrieving of protective gear is, at both broad and basic levels, done for the 
benefit of IBP” because without them the potential for contamination would 
                                                          
 139  Id. at 898. 
 140  Id.  
 141  Id. 
 142  Id. 
 143  Id. at 899. 
 144  Id. 
 145  Id. at 899-900. 
 146  Id. at 900. 
 147  Id. 
 148  Id. at 903 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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inevitably impede IBP’s disassembly process.149 Finally, and most importantly for 
the purposes of this Note, Alvarez stated as follows: 
This “integral and indispensable” conclusion extends to donning, doffing, 
and cleaning of non-unique gear (e.g. hardhats) and unique gear (e.g. 
Kevlar gloves) alike. Little time may be required to don safety glasses and 
the use of safety goggles is undoubtedly pervasive in industrial work. But 
ease of donning and ubiquity of use do not make the donning of such 
equipment any less “integral and indispensable” as that term is defined in 
Steiner.150 
Although the Ninth Circuit interpreted the “integral and indispensable” test broadly 
enough to apply to both “unique and non-unique gear,” it ultimately excluded time 
spent donning and doffing the non-unique gear as de minimis. The court noted that 
“time spent donning and doffing non-unique protective gear, ‘although essential to 
the job[] and required by the employer[,]’ is at once so insubstantial and so difficult 
to monitor that it is de minimis as a matter of law.”151 The Supreme Court later 
affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and limited it to the specific facts of that 
case.152 The Third Circuit has since followed suit in De Ascencio v. Tyson Foods, 
Inc.153  
B. Reich v. IBP, Inc.: “Exertion” Test 
While the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the exertion test in its Alvarez 
decision, courts in the Tenth and Fifth Circuits have continued to support its 
usage.154 In both Circuits, employers must generally compensate employees for tasks 
that require physical or mental effort beyond an ordinary degree of concentration.155  
In Reich v. IBP, Inc., the Secretary of Labor brought an action against the famous 
meat packing company to enforce overtime and record-keeping provisions of the 
FLSA.156 There, company employees were required to wear certain garments and 
safety equipment for protection during the plant’s regular hours of production.157 
Workers were paid in accordance with “line time” and were divided into two distinct 
                                                          
 149  Id. 
 150  Id. Note that this language explicitly rejects the exertion test considered infra Section 
IV.B. See also De Ascencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 500 F.3d 361 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding jury 
instructions impermissibly directed jury to consider whether employees demonstrated 
sufficient exertion in deciding whether their activities were compensable under the FLSA). 
 151  See Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 904 (quoting Reich v. IBP, Inc., 38 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 
1994)); see also Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d at 1061 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that seven 
to eight minutes spent by employees reading log book and exchanging information, even if not 
preliminary, was de minimis, and therefore not compensable). 
 152  See IBP, Inc., 546 U.S. 21, 41 (2005). 
 153  See De Ascencio, 500 F.3d at 372. 
 154  See Darch et al., supra note 4. 
 155  Id. 
 156  See Reich, 38 F.3d at 1124. 
 157  Id. 
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categories: those who used knives in their duties and those who did not.158 Knife-
wielding workers were required to wear specialized safety equipment and protective 
gear consisting of “a mesh apron, a plastic belly guard, mesh sleeves or plastic arm 
guards, wrist wraps, mesh gloves, rubber gloves, ‘polar sleeves,’ rubber boots, a 
chain belt, a weight belt, a scabbard, and shin guards,” while non-knife wielding 
workers wore hard hats, earplugs, safety footwear, safety eyewear, and clean, white, 
and outer-garments required of all employees.159  
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit determined that IBP failed to compensate its knife-
wielding workers for time spent “taking off, cleaning and storing the specialized 
safety equipment.”160 Ruling in favor of the employees in part, the court ultimately 
reached the same conclusion as Alvarez, but did so for a different reason.161 The 
Tenth Circuit held that compensation was owed for tasks requiring “physical or 
mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer 
and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer”162 Thus, the 
goggles and hard hats that the non-knife wielding employees donned and doffed did 
not require compensation because they required very little concentration.163 
Alternatively, the court found that compensation was owed to the knife-wielding 
employees because the donning and doffing of specialized gear required “physical 
exertion, time, and a modicum of concentration to put [it] on securely and properly” 
and was different “in kind, not simply degree, from the mere act of dressing.”164 
C. Perez v. Mountainaire Farms, Inc.: “Benefit to Employee Versus Employer” Test 
The Fourth Circuit has adopted its own test for compensation claims under the 
FLSA.165 The Fourth Circuit instructs employers to evaluate the purpose for which 
the equipment is worn and whom the equipment benefits most.166 This test is best 
illustrated in Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc.167 
In Perez, a group of uncompensated poultry processing employees filed suit 
against their employer, Mountaire, for time spent donning and doffing personal 
protective equipment.168 Mountaire managed the operation of its business much like 
IBP: employees were instructed to begin work on the production line when the first 
chickens arrived, end work when the last chicken left, and complete a number of 
                                                          
 158  Id. 
 159  Id. at 1124-25. 
 160  Id. 
 161  See Darch et al., supra note 4. 
 162  See Reich, 38 F.3d at 1125 (quoting Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda 
Local, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944)). 
 163  Id. 
 164  Id. at 1126. 
 165  Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 650 F.3d 350, 365-66 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 166  See Darch et al., supra note 4. 
 167  See Perez, 650 F.3d at 350. 
 168  Id. at 360. 
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preparatory activities.169 Employees were then compensated based strictly on “line 
time,” which excluded their preliminary and postliminary work.170 
To calculate the amount of compensable time, the court applied Steiner’s 
“integral and indispensable” test to the donning and doffing activities at issue. Perez 
then concluded that because the preparatory activities “primarily benefit Mountaire 
by ‘protecting the products from contamination, help[ing] keep workers’ 
compensation payments down, keep[ing] missed time to a minimum, and shield[ing] 
the company from pain and suffering payments,’” they were “integral and 
indispensable” to the plant’s operation and required compensation.171 Notably, Perez 
did not distinguish between activities that involved either “specialized” gear or 
absorbent amounts of exertion. Thus, the employees were able to recover for the 
entire amount of uncompensated work.172 
D. Gorman v. Consolidated Edison Corp.: Hybrid Test 
Some jurisdictions have tried to combine elements of both the “unique gear” and 
“exertion” tests. For instance, in Gorman v. Consolidated Edison Corp., a case from 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, workers at a nuclear power plant facility filed 
suit against their employer to recover wages for time spent passing through security 
screening and donning and doffing non-unique protective gear, including metal 
capped safety boots, safety glasses, and a helmet.173 Although it was undisputed that 
employees were paid for donning and doffing specialized protective gear required 
within the nuclear containment area, the court had to determine whether 
compensation was also required for the more basic equipment and preliminary 
waiting time.174  
To make this determination, the court considered elements of both Alvarez and 
Reich. The court found that “indispensable” meant “necessary” and integral meant 
“essential to completeness” or “organically joined or linked.”175 Accordingly, 
workers’ helmets, safety glasses, and metal-capped safety boots were 
“indispensable” [necessary] but not “integral” [essential to completeness] to their 
activities (even though such equipment was required by government regulation).176 
The court recognized that it was not following the Ninth Circuit’s Alvarez decision, 
citing it for the proposition that “donning and doffing of non-unique gear (e.g. hard 
hats) [is] [both] ‘integral and indispensable” as that term is defined in Steiner.177 The 
panel concluded, “donning and doffing of a helmet, safety glasses and boots are 
‘relatively effortless,’” evoking the Reich test of exertion or concentration required 
                                                          
 169  Id. 
 170  Id. 
 171  Id. at 367. 
 172  Id. at 376. 
 173  See Gorman v. Consol. Edison Corp., 488 F.3d 586, 598 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 174  Id.; see also Darch et al., supra note 4.  
 175  Gorman, 488 F.3d at 592. 
 176  Id. at 593. 
 177  Recall however that Alvarez did not require compensation for non-unique gear on other 
grounds  (i.e. de minimis doctrine). Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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to complete a task.178 Thus, employers need not compensate workers for donning and 
doffing non-unique gear.179 
The Second Circuit’s reasoning, though different in form, is theoretically similar 
in substance to many of the tests discussed above—in at least two of the those 
instances, Alvarez and Reich, employees were limited to some extent by what they 
could recover.180 The same story holds true in Gorman: employees could not recover 
for time spent donning and doffing non-specialized gear. Employers in the Second 
Circuit would be well-advised to consider the specific facts of each case and ask two 
separate questions: (1) does the claim involve time spent donning and doffing 
specialized gear?—and if so, (2) does the activity require physical or mental 
exertion?181 If the answer is yes to both, then employers should compensate 
employees for their time. 
V. THE FLSA SHOULD BE CONSTRUED NARROWLY TO CURB LITIGATION AGAINST 
EMPLOYERS 
A. The Narrow Tests: Alvarez, Reich, and Gorman 
Alvarez, Reich, and Gorman exemplify attempts to narrow the scope of 
compensable activities under the FLSA to exclude the sorts of preliminary and 
postliminary activities anticipated by the Portal-to-Portal Act. While Alvarez 
interprets those activities to be “integral and indispensable” to the principal activities 
on the production line, it excludes them from compensation under the de minimis 
time doctrine.182 In doing so, it accomplishes the same policy goals by limiting 
employer liability—albeit through a more back channel approach.183 Gorman, on the 
other hand, interprets the activities at issue to be “indispensable” (necessary) but not 
“integral” (essential) to the principal activities on the production line and excludes 
them from compensation accordingly based on the lack of required exertion.184 Reich 
takes it one step further. Under Reich, the preliminary and postliminary activities at 
issue are neither “integral nor indispensable” because they can be accomplished with 
“less than a modicum of concentration.”185  
In each approach, it could be said that employees “won” their case in the sense 
that they recovered large amounts of money for donning and doffing specialized 
gear. Employers, however, should be content with the approach the Circuit Courts 
have taken in limiting compensation for time spent working with non-specialized 
gear. Further, because these legal doctrines expand beyond the facts of each case, the 
prevailing message behind the narrower cases is that employees bear the burden of 
proving something beyond “suffering” to recover compensation.  
                                                          
 178  Gorman, 488 F.3d at 594. 
 179  Id. 
 180  See supra Part IV.A-B. 
 181  Darch et al., supra note 4. 
 182  Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 904. 
 183  29 U.S.C. § 202(b) (2015). 
 184  Gorman, 488 F.3d at 594. 
 185  See Reich v. IBP, Inc., 38 F.3d 1123, 1126 (10th Cir. 1994) 
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1. The Burden of Proving Compensable Work 
Under Alvarez, the burden is weak. Because Alvarez concedes that preliminary 
donning and doffing activities are “integral and indispensable” to the principal 
activities of a production line, employees seeking to recover lost compensation need 
only prove that their activities fall outside the scope of the de minimis time 
doctrine.186 As discussed above, work is de minimis when the matter at issue 
concerns only a few minutes of work beyond regularly scheduled hours and the 
employee is not required to exert a substantial amount of time and effort.187 From a 
practical perspective, however, courts have struggled to set a threshold for the de 
minimis doctrine, which has made it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to apply 
a consistent standard.188 For instance, the de minimis exception may bar 
compensation for several activities when viewed separately, but may permit those 
same activities if the activities are aggregated together.189 This incoherent threshold 
provides greater flexibility to employees in crafting plausible scenarios through 
which they then convince jurors and judges that time spent conducting an activity 
was compensable. Because donning and doffing activities are recognized as “integral 
and indispensable” to the principal activity,190 employers could hypothetically face 
liability for just about anything once the de minimis doctrine is removed as an 
obstacle. So, while Alvarez has the potential to shield employers from liability in 
certain situations, it is not their best bet. 
Under Reich, employers are well protected from mass litigation claims stemming 
from the most preliminary (or postliminary) of tasks, such as walking, cleaning, 
clocking-in or out, and anything else requiring less than a modicum of 
concentration.191 Although Reich does not shield employers from liability for more 
specialized tasks tied to the employee’s principal activity, the fact is that most 
employers are probably willing, if not happy, to adequately compensate employees 
for doing their job.192 For all remaining activities, employees bear the brunt of the 
burden to show that they exerted some sort of physical or mental exertion beyond 
ordinary expectation.193 Of the three cases discussed in this section, Reich’s 
“exertion test” provides the most amount of security for unwary employers. 
Gorman presents an interesting curveball for employers because it protects them 
from compensation claims stemming from “relatively effortless” activities while also 
                                                          
 186  Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 904. 
 187  See Brock v. City of Cincinnati, 236 F.3d 793, 804 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 188  See supra note 22.  
 189  See, e.g., Addison v. Huron Stevedoring Corp., 204 F.2d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 1953) 
(granting relief for claims that would have been de minimis on a daily basis but for the fact 
that, when aggregated together, they amounted to a substantial claim); Nardone v. General 
Motors, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 336, 336 (C.C.D. N.J. 1962) (upholding the de minimis doctrine 
when the claim was calculated in terms of minutes per day). 
 190  Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 904. 
 191  See Reich v. IBP, Inc., 38 F.3d 1123, 1126 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 192  See supra Section IV.B (regarding employers agreement to provide compensation for 
specialized work in Reich). 
 193  See Reich, 38 F.3d at 1125. 
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exposing them to litigation for work that is integral to completion of the principal 
activity.194 While activities such as walking may be too effortless to require 
compensation, activities that occur just seconds prior to or after the principal activity 
itself—and which are required in order to complete that activity—must be 
compensated.195 For instance, Alvarez required employees to “gather their assigned 
equipment . . . [and] prepare work-related tools before venturing to the slaughter or 
processing floors.”196 Further, employees were required to “clean, restore, and 
replace their tools and equipment” at the end of each shift.197 These are the sorts of 
activities that employers could be liable for under Gorman. In sum, the case presents 
a strong compromise among the “narrow” jurisdictions while still addressing the 
needs of employers in minimizing litigation risks. 
Factual differences alone cannot explain the logic behind these conflicting 
methods as the majority of cases present very similar circumstances.198 The reality is 
simply that the “true cause of the split is in the law itself—the circuit courts simply 
disagree on the proper test for determining when [and how] employees must be 
compensated.”199 But these decisions reflect more than a scholarly pursuit of legal 
academia: they have real consequences for real people.200 A test is only useful if it 
can be applied practically and consistently to resolve disputes.201 Consistency with 
prior precedent establishes predictability in the law; consistency with the underlying 
rational of the FLSA supports public policy objectives; and consistency in 
application among various courts enhances the perception of fairness in our legal 
system.202 In light the discussion in Part I,203 the reality is that claims for 
compensation have spiraled out of control, and employers are more vulnerable now 
than ever. Courts should bear this trend in mind as they struggle to find the proper 
framework for assessing the validity of donning and doffing claims under the FLSA. 
A. The Broad Test: Perez 
So far, this Note has withheld detailed discussion of the “benefit to employer 
versus employee” test adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Perez. The Perez test focuses 
primarily on whether the activity in question benefits the employee, through 
protection from workplace hazards, or the employer, by protecting the product.204 
Much like the narrow Alvarez test, the Perez line of cases illustrates the same 
troubling trend this Note has attempted to resolve: potential overexposure of 
                                                          
 194  See Gorman v. Consol. Edison Corp., 488 F.3d 586, 590 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 195  See Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 903. 
 196  See id. at 898.  
 197  Id. 
 198  See Watts, supra note 18, at 298. 
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employers to trigger-happy plaintiffs. Aside from the obvious problems this Note has 
already addressed in Part I, two additional concerns merit further discussion.  
1. Perez Represents a Departure from the “Integral and Indispensable” Standard 
First, the benefits test represents a significant departure from the legal analysis 
that is overwhelmingly employed in the context of donning and doffing litigation. 
Accordingly, it should be cast aside. As set forth above, most circuit courts attempt 
to define compensable “work” by considering whether or not the activity is “integral 
and indispensable” to the employee’s principal job duties.205 Admittedly, this is not 
the only way to approach the issue. Recall that the “integral and indispensable” test 
is one of many factors examined by a line of Supreme Court cases attempting to 
define the term “work” under the FLSA.206 The Perez test represents an attempt to 
emphasize the remaining factors: whether an activity is “controlled or required by 
the employer” and/or “pursued necessarily and primarily for the employer’s 
benefit.”207 While the approach is not wrong as a matter of law, it is improper in the 
context of donning and doffing activities because such activities take place outside of 
scheduled work time. Accordingly, Chao v. Gotham Registry, Inc. reiterates that the 
“integral and indispensable” test should govern: 
The broad meaning that has emerged from Supreme Court cases describes 
“work” as an exertion or loss of employees time that is (1) controlled or 
required by the employer, (2) pursued necessarily and primarily for the 
employer’s benefit, and (3) if performed outside scheduled work time, an 
“integral and indispensable” part of the employee’s principal activities.208 
1.  Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk: An Emerging Trend 
Second, the Supreme Court recently addressed the matter further in Integrity 
Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk.209 Integrity involved a pair of hourly employees who 
retrieved products from warehouse shelves and packaged those products for delivery 
to Amazon customers.210 At the end of each shift, the warehouse workers were 
required to undergo security screenings before leaving the warehouses—this 
required them to remove wallets, keys, belts, and pass through a metal detector—a 
process that took roughly twenty-five minutes each day.211 When plaintiffs were 
uncompensated for time spent waiting in line, they brought suit against Integrity, 
arguing that the screens were done to prevent employee theft for the sole benefit of 
the employer and its customers.212 The Supreme Court ruled that “preliminary and 
                                                          
 205  See Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 255 (1956). 
 206  See supra Section I, at note 15 (regarding the “broad meaning that has emerged from 
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postliminary activities done at the employer’s request or for the employer’s benefit” 
do not necessarily result in compensable time.213 Instead, the Court “narrowed the 
definition of ‘integral and indispensable’ to cover only those activities that are an 
‘intrinsic element’ of an employee’s principal activities.”214 The Court further 
clarified that an activity is “integral and indispensable” to a worker’s principal duties 
if it is “one with which the employee cannot dispense if he is to perform his principal 
activities.”215 Interestingly, the language supported by the Supreme Court in Integrity 
is essentially identical to the Gorman test, yet written in inverse form—Gorman 
exposes employers to litigation for work that is integral to completion of the 
principal activity. Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas held that “[t]he screenings 
were not an intrinsic element of retrieving products from warehouse shelves or 
packing them for shipment[,]”—and therefore were not “integral or indispensable” to 
the employees’ principal activities, because products could be retrieved and 
packaged without security screening.216 
Integrity’s conclusion is important for three reasons. First, Integrity’s rejection of 
a broad brush to the “integral and indispensable” test falls in line with this Note’s 
proposal for a more narrow interpretation. Integrity makes clear that, “[i]f the test 
could be satisfied merely by the fact that an employer required an activity . . . it 
would sweep into ‘principal activities’ the very activities that the Portal-to-Portal Act 
was designed to address.”217 Second, Integrity explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach in Alvarez and implicitly backed the holding of Gorman. In addition to 
unraveling Alvarez’s “broad brush” approach, Integrity noted that even if the 
activities had been de minimis, as they were in Alvarez, “[t]he fact that an employer 
could conceivably reduce the time spent by employees on any preliminary or 
postliminary activity does not change the nature of the activity or its relationship to 
the principal activities that an employee is employed to perform.”218 Third, and most 
important, the Court’s partial resolution of the “integral and indispensable” issue 
provides much needed guidance to circuit courts and employers regarding pre- and 
post-shift tasks tied to donning and doffing activities.219 For the foregoing reasons, 
the “benefits” test is best understood as an outlier and one that is not to be used in 
the modern era of donning and doffing claims. 
VI. PROPOSAL: THE SECOND CIRCUIT COMPROMISE 
Although this Note has primarily focused its efforts on advocating on behalf of 
employers, certain theoretical realities exist with regard to the FLSA in the sense that 
it was primarily adopted for the benefit of workers. Accordingly, any reasonable 
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proposal must also take into account the FLSA’s primary aim to effectuate higher 
wages, shorter hours, and better working conditions for all employees covered under 
the Act. 
The Reich test offers the most amount of protection to employers. But it also 
provides the most amount of harm to employees by robbing them of the fruits of 
their “suffering.” Conversely, the Alvarez and Perez tests ensure that employees 
receive wages for minute and preliminary tasks, but do so at great expense to their 
employers. The Second Circuit’s approach in Gorman appears most suited for 
adoption by the Supreme Court from both a pragmatic and policy perspective. By 
protecting employers from compensation claims for “relatively effortless” activities 
while also exposing them to litigation for work that is essential to completion of the 
principal activity, Gorman squeezes into the gap created by the ambiguous language 
of the FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal amendments.220 In doing so, Gorman ensures 
two very important outcomes: legitimate claims for uncompensated “work” time are 
fully covered by the FLSA and frivolous suits fall by the wayside. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Note was inspired by the modern day, wage and hour litigation epidemic 
that continues to clog the federal courts. Parts I through V examined this epidemic in 
the context of employer liability as it relates to claims for uncompensated “work” 
time resulting from donning and doffing activities.  This Note concluded that “work” 
should be construed more narrowly under the FLSA to reduce employers’ risks of 
exposure to litigation in the future. It then ended with a brief discussion pinpointing 
an ideal standard that accomplished this goal without undermining the broader 
purposes of the Act. 
Interestingly, this Note’s proposal provides important benefits to employees as 
well. When employers are caught up in litigation and fewer resources are available 
to invest in the business, employees are left with stagnating wages, poorer working 
conditions, and unhappy bosses. Further, employees engaged in litigation against 
their employer are generally unable or unwilling to return to their respective 
positions and face certain career challenges. The reality is that legal ambiguity 
imposes difficulties on all parties involved. The end result is cyclical: because parties 
cannot adequately predict the outcomes of cases, they refuse to settle, and both are 
left significantly worse off than they would have been if the laws were clear. So, the 
frenzy of litigation continues.  
Adoption of a single, uniform standard of “work” in the context of donning and 
doffing litigation would go a long way toward eliminating that frenzy and ensuring 
that the FLSA is restored to prominence as a tool for the prosperity of both 
employers and employees. The Second Circuit’s Gorman test would be a good place 
to start. 
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